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Chapter 2
When millennials protest
Youth activism in Italy
Massimiliano Andretta and Donatella della Porta1
2.1 Young and anti-austerity protests in Italy: an introduction
Despite the various threats that the Millennial generation faces (from unem-
ployment, to precariousness and uncertainty), many young citizens still engage 
in politics, though not necessarily through conventional patterns of participa-
tion. The economic crisis and the related austerity policies have triggered pro-
test mobilizations in all southern European countries (della Porta et al., 2017). 
In these, younger generations have played a crucial role. Even though in Italy 
anti-austerity mobilizations have been led primarily by the old and established 
trade unions (Andretta, 2018; Andretta and della Porta, 2015), young people have 
been very much involved in those and in other kinds of protests. This young 
generation faces markedly different life expectations and/or conditions than the 
previous ones, and are more seriously threatened by the current economic crisis. 
In recent research, examining the participation of Millennials in Italy, Poland, 
Spain and the UK in progressive social movements, the self-identification as a 
precarious generation was in fact widespread (della Porta, 2019). This makes for 
a particularly interesting starting point to investigate how these citizens over-
come barriers of marginalization, network and develop collective identities.
Despite the fact that young people tend to be overrepresented in unconven-
tional politics, social movement studies have given scant attention to issues of 
age. There are, however, exceptions, from which we can draw some inspiration 
for reflecting on the impact of some specific age issues on contentious politics. 
In this, a first step would be to conceptualize appropriate terms to allow for this 
reflection. Indeed, youth, cohort and generation are relevant but distinct terms.
First, research on political participation has addressed the role of youth, who 
are considered in general terms as being less prone to conventional action and 
more, instead, to protest action. Social movement studies also recognize that 
protesting requires some biographical availability (McAdam, 1986, 1989). Time 
availability and lack of responsibilities are considered as relevant. Initially, there 
was indeed an expectation that growing older (namely, getting a job, marrying, 
having children) implied less flexibility in the use of one’s own time as well as 
increasing responsibility, which makes protest less likely: it becomes more costly 
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and potentially risky for middle-age persons than, for instance, young students. 
Also, there was an expectation that some material resources could help in buy-
ing time flexibility. Research indicates an effect of protesting on those sociobio-
graphical conditions is that individuals may end up delaying the formation of 
family or pushing towards some types of work rather than others. However, it 
could not definitively confirm that the taking up of work and family responsibil-
ity reduces the commitment to protest. If indeed married life tends to reduce the 
level of commitment (Corrigall-Brown, 2011), having a full-time job increases 
participation in voluntary organizations, and even in high-risk forms of par-
ticipation (Nepstad and Smith, 1999; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991; Passy and 
Giugni, 2001). In particular, growing older, getting a job and building a family do 
not necessarily reduce participation in protest. Recent research noted, however, 
that some conditions that affect biographical availability can impact the step that 
precedes the actual choice to participate: the development of positive motivations 
towards protest seems to decline for married people and full-time or part-time 
employees (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006). At the micro-level, student activism has 
been linked to specific characteristics of younger people, such as the availability 
of time and limited responsibilities, but also enthusiasm, idealism and exposure 
to new ideas (Lipset and Altbach, 1967). Students have been presented as spoiled, 
highly emotional, rebellious, unable to handle ambiguity, devoted to an ethic of 
absolute ends, irreverent, adventurist or radicalistic (Lipset, 1971).
Issues of age have been addressed in demographic analysis that point at the 
relevance of the size of the youth cohort on the amount and forms of protests. As 
Goldstone (2015: 148) summarized: 
An age cohort is simply a group of people of roughly the same age, who were 
born in a particular period. In the United States, it has become common to 
refer to those born between 1945 and 1960 as the ‘baby boomers’; those born 
from 1960 to 1980 as ‘Generation X;’ and those born from 1980 to 2000 
as ‘Millennials’. However, cohorts do not always vary or form systematic 
groups (Gen X in the United States is known mainly for being very diverse 
and hard to classify). Rather, their significance has more to do with whether 
a cohort experienced a major shift in its size, education, or experience rela-
tive to other cohorts.
The Arab Spring2 has, in this sense, been considered as developing in an envi-
ronment characterized by a large presence of young people. In fact, the socializa-
tion of new generations is considered as less challenging as: 
…when the numbers of people in society are stable or changing slowly 
enough for growth in the economy and institutions to accommodate the 
change. However, rapid change in the size of cohorts, or of particular social 
groups, can easily disrupt this process and place great strains on institutions. 
(Goldstone, 2015: 150)
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Cohorts acquire more of an impact on collective action when they go through some 
shared, important event that contributes to shaping their norms, values and behav-
iour in their future lives. In the conceptualization from Mannheim (1952: 292), we 
are therefore talking of a political generation. That is ‘a particular kind of identity 
of location, embracing related “age groups” embedded in a historical-social pro-
cess’. In particular, the 1968ers were named as a generation that had come of age 
during a moment of affluence and reduction of inequalities, endowed with ‘post-
materialist’ values (Inglehart, 1977) and broad political interests (Downtown and 
Wehr, 1997). Student activists of the 1960s were also said to be more likely to be 
children of left-wing fathers, often intellectuals, with middle-class (or even upper-
class) families with permissive and critical education (Lipset, 1971). Expressing 
the moral dissonance or frustration of a generation, the young activists criticized 
nevertheless their parents for their unfulfilled promises (Giugni, 2004).
With the aim of contributing to the debate on the impact of age (youth, cohort, 
generation) on contentious politics, our chapter focuses on the dynamics of the 
political commitment of young Italians. The particular cohort is defined as those 
aged between 14 and 40 years, involved in at least one collective mobilization 
between 2010 and 2011. The selected age cohort is intended to capture a genera-
tion facing a very different type of life expectations and/or conditions than the 
previous ones, and they are more seriously threatened by the ongoing economic 
crisis. By relying on data from several surveys carried out during protest events 
on social, economic and labour issues from 2010 to 2011, a period in which the 
economic crisis spread and deepened in Italy, we single out differences and simi-
larities between younger and older generations on those aspects that social move-
ment studies underline as crucial in explaining individual participation, namely 
grievance and emotion, collective identity and network embeddedness (della 
Porta and Diani, 2006).
The article is structured as follows: in the following section, we present the 
research method undertaken for this study. Following which, in the literature 
review we elaborate on the dimensions we decided to focus on, dealing respec-
tively with the generational composition of demonstrations selected, the type of 
grievances and emotions, collective identities, and, finally, network embedded-
ness. In the conclusion, we summarize the most important findings and suggest 
some tentative explanations in the Italian case.
2.2 The empirical research
In addressing the previously mentioned questions, we will use data on surveys 
of protest demonstrations in Italy carried out by Cosmos (Centre on Social 
Movement Studies) at the European University Institute within an international 
consortium coordinated by Bert Klandermans and Stefaan Walgrave, on a proj-
ect named Contextualizing Contestation (see www.protestsurvey.eu).
For this chapter, we restricted the analysis to four types of demonstrations 
in Italy: the traditional labour day demonstration (Florence 2011), a typical 
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anti-austerity protest (Rome 2012), an anti-neoliberal type of protest (Florence 
2012), and finally, a new type of protest directly involving the younger generation 
(the EuroMayday in Milan 2011). Demonstrators were sampled randomly and 
given a questionnaire to mail back. About 1,000 questionnaires were distributed 
at each demonstration, with an average return rate of 20%.3
Using the surveys conducted from the selected Italian demonstrations, this 
article focuses on the analysis of the ‘younger generation’ involved in them, 
operationalized by selecting those demonstrators born after 1985, thus, being 
25 years old or less at the moment of the selected demonstrations, compared with 
the ‘older generations’: those born between 1970 and 1984, (between 40 years 
and 26 years old), those born between 1955 and 1969 (between 55 and 41 years 
old), and those born in 1954 or earlier (over 55 years old). Our youngest genera-
tion category includes demonstrators being 24 years old on average (the standard 
deviation is 2.4 years); the second generation, those protestors being on average 
34 years old (the standard deviation is 4.3 years); the third generation, on aver-
age 50 years old (the standard deviation is 4 years), while in the last and oldest 
generation those on average 62 years old (with a standard deviation of 5.5 years).
2.3  Presence and social composition of the younger 
generations in Italian anti-austerity demonstrations
Research on political participation has long suggested that political participation 
increases with social centrality. The argument is that a higher socio-economic 
status is predictive of more political participation. The normative problems 
involved in this selectivity were increased by the non-representativeness of those 
who participated: in fact, higher levels of participation were observed, ceteris 
paribus, for the better educated, middle class, men, middle-age cohort, married 
people, city residents, ethnic majority and citizens involved in voluntary asso-
ciations (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Lagroye, 1993). Usually, higher social status 
implies in fact more material resources (but also free-time) to invest in political 
participation, as well as a higher probability of being successful in their careers 
(via personal relationships with powerful individuals) and especially a higher 
sense of personal achievement. Psychological disadvantages overlap with social 
disadvantages, reducing the perception of one’s own ‘droit de parole’ (Bourdieu, 
1979: 180). If participation responds to demands for equality, it tends however to 
reproduce inequalities since: 
…any individual participates, at least potentially, with the differential (or 
unequal) coefficient (if we do not want to use the word ‘privilege’, that would 
have an ancien régime flavour) that characterizes his/her position in the sys-
tem of private interests (Pizzorno, 1966: 90).
Social movement studies have challenged this elitist vision by presenting pro-
test as a resource of the powerless (Lipsky, 1970). They noted indeed that those 
Youth activism in Italy 45
who protest present some different characteristics than those who use conven-
tional forms of political participation: if the middle classes vote more, workers 
strike more often; and if those in middle age are more present in party-related 
activities, students occupy their schools and universities (della Porta, 2015). 
Nevertheless, social movement studies also recognized that protesting requires 
some biographical availability (McAdam, 1986, 1989). First, time availability 
and responsibilities are considered as relevant. Initially, there was indeed an 
expectation that growing older and the sociobiographical conditions that this 
usually entails (i.e. getting a job, marrying, having children) implied less flexibil-
ity in the use of one’s own time as well as increasing responsibility, which makes 
protest less likely. Even though research indicated an effect of those factors on 
protesting, and, indeed, married life tends to reduce the level of commitment 
(Corrigall-Brown, 2011), having a full-time job, however, increases participation 
in voluntary organizations, even in high-risk forms of participation (Nepstad and 
Smith, 1999; Wiltfang and McAdam, 1991; Passy and Giugni, 2001). In particu-
lar, growing older, getting a job and building a family do not necessarily reduce 
participation in protest.
Our research indicates that the presence of the youngest generation, in the four 
types of demonstrations that occurred in the period of crisis, was quite strong, 
accounting for 18% of the full sample, on average. However, if we look at its 
presence across the types of demonstrations (Table 2.1), we see that the youngest 
generation were most concentrated in what we called ‘youth against the crisis’ 
type of protest marches (27%) and in the anti-neoliberal type (23%). Meanwhile, 
about 16% demonstrated in the No Monti4 rally and as few as 2% in the tradi-
tional Labour Day demonstration. Both the No Monti day and the Labour Day 
demonstrations were dominated instead by the two oldest generations, while the 
second generation showed patterns of presence across demonstrations similar to 
the youngest one.
Moreover, only 11.5% of marchers belonging to the youngest generation said 
they had participated in their first demonstration during in the proceeding twelve 
months, whilst half had participated in more than one and less than five dem-
onstrations, and the rest had protested more than six times. Finally, against the 
expectation of the social centrality hypothesis, 17% of them had participated at 
Table 2.1 Age cohorts across types of demonstrations
Age Cohorts Euromayday, 
Milan
Mayday, 
Florence
No Monti Day, 
Rome
Florence 
10 + 10
Total
Till 26 26.8% 19% 16.3% 23.7% 17.7%
27–40 53.7% 7.6% 19.5% 29.0% 27.1%
41–55 12.2% 42.9% 39.5% 20.6% 29.5%
56 + 7.3% 47.6% 24.7% 26.7% 25.7%
Total 123 105 190 131 549
N = 549; Cr.s V: presence across types of demonstrations Italy, 0.29; significant at 0.001 level.
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least 11 times in the last 12 months against about 14% of the central generations 
and 18% of the oldest one.
Besides participation in protest marches, the youngest generation shows a high 
degree of commitment to various types of protest actions, and privileges the most 
radical ones (Figure 2.1).
Gender distribution is more balanced in the youngest generation (53% vs. an 
average of 47%). As for occupational distribution, those belonging to the young-
est generation were most often – but not exclusively – students (47%), 13% were 
unemployed or between jobs, 21% employed part-time and 8% were full-time. 
It is not surprising that the youngest generation is the most educated, with about 
90% of its members being at least graduates (first stage of tertiary), against an 
average of 65%.5
2.4 Grievances and emotions
Grievances theories have long been challenged by more recent approaches to 
social movement studies (Klandermans, 1997), suggesting that what is to be ana-
lysed is more how grievances are translated into action than grievances per se. 
Till 26 38.1 64.9 51.5 7.2
27–40 40.5 59.5 32.4 2
41–55 53.1 81.3 23.8 1.3
56 + 46.4 60.1 26.1 2.9
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Figure 2.1  Age cohorts by types of protest actions used in the past. (Note: We recoded 
the forms of action reported in the questionnaire as follows: conven-
tional [contacted politician, government or local government official; signed 
a petition, donated money to a political organization or group, and worn 
or displayed a campaign badge or sticker]; strike  [joined a strike]; direct 
action  [blockade, occupation, civil disobedience]; and violent  [any violent 
action against things and people]. N = 543; Cr.s V: across conventional forms, 
0.12, significant at 0.05 level; across strike, 0.20, significant at 0.001 level; 
across direct actions, 0.21, significant at 0.001 level, across violent forms, 
0.12, significant at 0.05 level.)
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Whilst it is certainly a valid suggestion, it does not mean that we should com-
pletely dismiss the analysis of grievances. As van Stekelemburg and Klandermans 
(2013: 888) have recently argued, ‘at the heart of every protest are grievances, 
be they, experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feel-
ings of injustice, moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly 
imposed grievance’. Social psychologists are among the few who continued to 
pay attention to grievances, by underlining how together with other dimensions, 
the relations between grievances and emotions is worth analysing to explain col-
lective action. In particular, they point at how grievances trigger a sense of injus-
tice, which often produces indignation, which in turn is transformed in anger 
(Klandermans et al., 2008).
There has recently been a recognition that social movement politics is pas-
sionate politics (Goodwin et al., 2001), as ‘participants in rituals communicate 
whole complexes of ideas and embodied feelings’ (Barker, 2001: 188). Social 
movements are certainly rich in emotion: ‘Anger, fear, envy, guilt, pity, shame, 
awe, passion, and other feelings play a part either in the formation of social 
movements, in their relations with their targets…and in the life of potential 
recruits and members’ (Kemper, 2001: 58). Different typologies have been built 
that distinguish emotions that address a specific object from more generic ones, 
or short-term versus long-term emotions, or reciprocal versus shared emotions 
(Goodwin et al., 2001). Emotions of trauma (grief, shame, helpless anger) are 
distinguished from emotions of resistance (pride, happiness, love, safety, confi-
dence, righteous anger) in research on the movement against child sexual abuse 
(Whittier, 2001: 239). Feelings such as anger, outrage or fear can be particularly 
relevant in recruitment; indignation, pleasure, and pride can reinforce commit-
ment (Goodwin et al., 2001). Emotions are embedded in a context, where social 
rules define the proper emotions to feel and the proper way to express them. 
In fact, emotions are produced in social interactions: rituals produce emotions, 
and emotions interact with cognition in determining an individual’s behaviour.
Social movements as well as protest events tend to transform emotions 
(e.g. transforming shame into solidarity), or to intensify them (Collins, 2001: 
29). Successful rituals produce collective effervescence and group solidarity, 
strengthening the emotional energy. For example, some protest rituals and lan-
guage helped transform shame into pride in the gay and lesbian communities 
(Gould, 2003; see also chapter 4 in this volume). In particular, social movements 
transform emotions by modifying the everyday relations the ‘old’ emotions were 
attached to (Calhoun, 2001: 55). Specific groups or specific environments nur-
ture master emotional paradigms (or habitus) that define appropriate emotions 
(della Porta and Giugni, 2009).
In order to investigate grievances, we focus on their more political compo-
nent, by looking at protestors’ attitudes toward the political system and main 
political actors, as well as on their levels of satisfaction with the democracy in 
their country. Institutional trust is generally very low, showing similarities in 
the political grievance across generations: only 2.5% of protestors trust quite 
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or very much national governments and 5% the parliament, with no significant 
differences across age cohorts. But, if only about 6% trust political parties, 
the percentage rises to 11% amongst the oldest protestors and decline to a 
mere 3% amongst the two cohorts of young protestors. Trade unions and the 
EU are more trusted, however, on overage by respectively 24% and 27% of 
protestors. If trust in EU is similar across generations, trade unions are much 
more trusted by the two older generations (34% and 25%) than by the young 
protestors (about 17%).6
Satisfaction with democracy is also very low in general with no statistical dif-
ferences between generations: on a scale from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very 
much satisfied), all participants’ answers scored only about 2.4, while the average 
of the youngest generation was 2.2.
Dissatisfaction with democracy calls into question the role of political parties, 
which were not trusted at all. However, whilst all generations were not trusting of 
political parties in general, most felt at least quite close to a specific party (about 
75%, with no statistical differences across cohorts).
The attitude towards elections did not differ much between generations 
either: about 58% of the youngest and the following two generations disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with the statement, ‘voting is useless in this coun-
try’, while the percentage increased to 75% among protestors of the oldest 
generation.7 What is more, about 98% of the protestors in our sample voted for 
one party in the last elections before the demonstrations, mostly for the centre-
left and radical-left parties. Therefore, despite the mistrust expressed in rela-
tion to political actors and institutions, and the dissatisfaction with the Italian 
democracy, all protestors seemed to consider elections an important tool to put 
their claims forward.
As far as emotions are concerned, our questionnaire included a battery of four 
items, which sought to measure the emotional side of demonstrators’ mobili-
zation. Respondents were asked to express how angry, worried, frustrated or 
fearful they felt when they thought of the problems they were protesting about, 
using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). If we look at the percentages 
of those feeling each emotion ‘very strongly’, protestors all felt worried about 
the current situation (about 70%, with no statistical differences between genera-
tions), but a little fearful (only 22% on average, with no statistical differences), 
the youngest generation felt a bit more frustrated (50% against the average of 
42%), but surprisingly, a bit less angry (57% against 63% in average).8
On the other hand, even when worried and angry, our protestors had not lost 
their belief that they could make a difference, and have in impact on the current 
situation: about 70% on average declared that they have an impact individually, but 
as many as 80% expressed the belief that ‘groups have an impact’ and that ‘inter-
national cooperation among groups has an impact’. Again, no remarkable genera-
tional differences could be found on this sense of individual and collective efficacy.
To sum up, the youngest generation protesting in Italy in times of crisis 
do not differ too much in terms of grievances and emotions from the older 
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generations. They were all indignant towards the political system, a system in 
which they were probably considered unable to deal with their life problems, and 
‘deaf’ to their voice. The youngest protestors trusted institutions and political 
actors a bit less, but mistrust was widespread across all generations. The very low 
trust in political parties and representative institutions is linked to their strong 
dissatisfaction with democracy. However, if this makes them particularly angry 
and worried, it had not undermined their confidence on the impact of their voice.
2.5 Is there a generational collective identity in Italy?
Alessandro Pizzorno (1966) noted long ago that the characteristics of political 
participation are rooted in the systems of solidarity that are at the basis of the 
very definition of interest: interests can in fact be singled out only with reference 
to a specific value system, and values push individuals to identify with wider 
groups in society, providing a sense of belonging to them and the willingness to 
mobilize for them. From this perspective, participation is an action in solidar-
ity with others that aims at protecting or transforming the dominant values and 
interest systems. The process of participation requires therefore the construction 
of solidarity communities within which individuals perceive of themselves and 
are recognized as equals. Political participation itself aims at this identity con-
struction: before mobilizing as a worker, an individual has to identify herself as a 
worker and feel that she belongs to a working class. Identification as awareness of 
being part of a collective us facilitates political participation. As Pizzorno (1966: 
109) stated, in fact, the latter ‘increases (it is more intense, clearer, more precise) 
when class consciousness is high’. Participation is therefore explained not only 
by individual resources, but also by collective resources.
In fact, recent research has looked at the shift from individual to group identi-
ties, and then the politicization of such identities. In social movement studies, 
collective identification is expected only if there is awareness of the fact that 
one’s own destiny is in large part linked to material conditions, while the lack of 
such awareness is defined as false consciousness (Snow and Lessor, 2013).
Identity formation is a complex process, which is difficult to operationalize. 
As far as our data are concerned, relevant indicators included in the question-
naire are identification with other demonstrators and the organizations stag-
ing the demonstrations, as well as various motivations, values and norms that 
pushed participants into the street. Our research data indicates that the young-
est generation of protestors identifies less than the other generations, especially 
the oldest ones, both with participants (57% identify ‘quite’, or ‘very much’ 
against 67% on average; Cr.s V = 0.21, significant at 0.001 level) and with the 
organizations staging the demonstration (56% vs. 60%, Cr. V = 0.19, significant 
at 0.001 level).
With respect to motivations, the youngest generation seemed less motivated to 
participate in the selected demonstrations ‘to express solidarity’; ‘to press politi-
cians’; because they ‘feel morally obliged’; and because they want ‘to raise awareness’ 
50 Massimiliano Andretta et al.
in the public opinion; while no significant differences are found when protestors are 
motivated ‘to express their view’ and ‘to defend their interests’ (Figure 2.2).
If we build an indicator of ‘motivation strength’, ranging from 0 (no motiva-
tion at all) to 1 (strongly motivated),9 we notice that against a mean of 0.42, the 
youngest generation scores only 0.36, while the most strongly motivated genera-
tion is composed by the protestors who were at least 50 years old at the time of 
the selected demonstrations, with a score of 0.51 (Figure 2.2).
If we look instead at the self-location of the different generations on a classi-
cal left–right scale, we notice that the youngest generation of protestors, together 
with those of the second youngest generation, are less radical than the others: in 
the 0–10 left–right scale, in fact, young protestors score on average 1.3 while the 
two oldest one between 0.7 and 0.8.10
Summarizing, it seems that the youngest generation had a weaker collective 
identity than the other ones, at least as far as identification with other demonstra-
tors (individually or in group) is concerned. The old generations were more radi-
cal, identified more with collective identities and were more motivated.
2.6 Networks and embeddedness
A different set of explanations for participation looks at embeddedness in social net-
works (Diani, 1992; della Porta, 2013). The main assumption is that participation 
in protests requires supporting networks that provide positive incentives, not only 
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Figure 2.2  Age cohorts by motivations for protesting. (Note: N: 469–505. Cr.s V is 
significant for ‘press politicians’  [0.28, at 0.001 level]; rise awareness [0.13, 
at 0.05 level], ‘express solidarity’  [0.15, at 0.01 level], and ‘moral obliga-
tion’ [0.18, at 0.001 level]. The ETA of the means calculated on the indicator 
of ‘motivational strength’ is 0.21, significant at 0.001 level.)
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in affective terms but also in cognitive ones. Networks, which are relevant for the 
explanation of differential political participation, are those that provide information 
about protest events as well as emotional support. In line with the literature on social 
capital, these networks are expected to provide norms of reciprocity and reciprocal 
trust that are relevant for collective action. Embeddedness helps overcome the free-
rider phenomenon by providing a sense of commitment as well as social control. So 
much so, that the single most relevant factor in explaining participation in protests 
was whether one had been asked to participate (Schussman and Soule, 2005).
The presence of dense but informal networks distinguishes social movements 
from other collective actors, which instead have clear organizational boundaries. 
In social movements, individuals and organizations, while keeping their autono-
mous identities, engage in sustained exchanges of resources oriented to the pur-
suit of a common goal (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 21).
In a cross-national study on protest participation based on the World Values 
Survey, Russell Dalton and his colleagues (Dalton et al., 2010) noted that 
‘involvement in social groups creates networks for recruitment in political life’ 
(ibid.: 59). In fact, ‘social group membership are strong and significant predic-
tors of protest’ (ibid.: 67). Similarly, in research on immigrants’ mobilization, 
Klandermans et al. (2008) observed that participation in associations was very 
highly correlated with experiences with protest, as well as with other dimensions 
connected with protest, such as identification with an ethnic group, sense of effi-
cacy and feelings of injustice.
To operationalize network embeddedness, we use three sets of variables: the 
first set included whomever respondents were protesting with (if alone, with their 
family, with friends and acquaintances, with colleagues or with other members 
of the organization they belong to); the second, the most important channels 
of information through which protesters knew about the demonstration (main-
stream or alternative media, family, informal, work or organizational channels); 
the third, their membership in different types of organizations.
The first set of variables has been aggregated by considering a scale of network 
embeddedness. This means that if a protesting individual was accompanied by 
friends and acquaintances, he/she is included in external networks; if he/she was 
with colleagues, he/she would be put in place of work/study networks; and if he/
she was with other members of an organization, he/she would be considered part 
of an organizational network.
The data presented in Figure 2.3 shows that the youngest generation of protes-
tors were more embedded in informal networks, such as friends, in networks 
based on the place of work or study, but also in organizational networks. The only 
relevant difference with the other generations seems to be that they rely more on 
relations built in their places of study, compared with relations in places of work 
of the older generations.
As far as the channels of information are concerned, the most important, and 
indeed interesting, difference refers to the much higher use of online alternative 
media and informal networks by the youngest generation (Figure 2.4). It is to be 
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remarked that the youngest protestors were less likely to use traditional media com-
pared with the older ones. Moreover, against an average of 41% of protestors getting 
informed through organizational channels, only 26% of the youngest ones do so.
Finally, as far as organizational membership is concerned, 25% of the youngest 
generation participants were members of the organizations staging the demon-
strations, against an average of 42%11; 37% (vs. 27% on average) were not mem-
bers of any organization at the time of the demonstration or in the 12 months 
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Figure 2.4  Most important channels of information across generations. (Note: N = 501; 
Cr.s V: 0.24, significant at 0.001 level.)
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Till 26
27–40
9.4 3.1 33.3 22.9 31.3
7.5 7.5 42.5 9.6 32.9
41–55 10.9 14.7 18.6 8.3 47.4
56 + 19.3 14.3 23.6 3.6 39.3
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Figure 2.3  Network embeddedness of the different generations. (Note: N: 538, Cr. s V: 
0.20; significant at 0.001 level.)
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previous; 27% (vs. 29% average) were members of a single organization; 26% (vs. 
32% average) were members of two or three organizations; and 11% (as on aver-
age) were members of more than three.12
If we look at the types of organizational membership (Figure 2.5), we notice 
that the youngest generation were prevalently members of social movement orga-
nizations or sports and culture organizations. Surprisingly, 21% of the young-
est cohort were members of a political party – only the oldest generation show 
more party membership – while 18% stated that they were members of church 
or welfare organizations. Trade unions attracted more of the older generations, 
and though it comes as no surprise that only 8% of the youngest protestors were 
among their members, it is of some interest to note the relatively low score in this 
type of membership of the protestors from the 1970 to 1984 cohort, confirming 
the decline of unionization among young workers.
To sum up, the different generations were embedded in different types of net-
works. For the youngest generation of protestors, these were mostly informal and 
based on new, online, types of communication, whereas the older cohort were 
more formally embedded in organizations.
2.7 A generational comparison: some conclusions
In conclusion, we have observed that young people have participated in different 
marches on austerity issues, bringing with them experiences of social groups that 
are outside of the labour market. While similar to other cohorts in their mistrust 
Trade Unions Party
Social 
Movements
Church and 
Welfare
Sport and 
Culture
Till 26
27–40
8 21 44 18 32
28 20 48 23 30
41–55 58 20 44 15 19
56 + 40 30 37 15 20
0
10
20
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40
50
60
70
Till 26 27–40 41–55 56 +
Figure 2.5  Age cohorts by type of organizational membership. (Note: N: 549; Cr.s V is 
significant for membership in trade unions [0.36, at 0.001 level] and in sport 
and culture organizations [0.13, at 0.05 level].)
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for political institutions and trust instead in protest as a form of political partici-
pation, the young people we surveyed who had taken part in the anti-austerity 
protests seemed to have some specific characteristics in terms of a lower degree 
of collective identification and organizational embeddedness, and instead a 
higher degree of informal and ‘virtual’ connectedness.
These results seem, therefore, to resonate with those of recent research on 
youth mobilization in protest. From the generational point of view, research, 
in particular in the United States, has often lamented that, in contrast with the 
generation that came of age during World War II that was highly engaged in a 
duty-based citizenship (Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2009), more recent generations 
have been considered as less engaged in conventional forms of political and civic 
activities (Fisher, 2012; Caren et al., 2011: 147). As Fisher (2012) noted, however, 
several recent studies (again, in the United States) observed significant changes 
in the political participation of young people, who are said to protest at least as 
much as earlier cohorts, even if alternative forms of commitment, such as con-
sumer activism, are increasingly popular amongst young people (e.g. Nonomura, 
2016) and the same is true for petitions (Caren et al., 2011: 147). The social and 
political engagement of young people is not necessarily declining, but changing 
form (Earl et al., 2017). So, ‘it is not that youth are disengaged, but rather that they 
do not engage in the same way that “dutiful” generations have’ (Earl et al., 2017: 
1). In particular, young people’s participation has developed towards ‘engaged 
citizenship’ in volunteering as well as embedding activism in their everyday life. 
Moreover, a new generation has been singled out – often called ‘Millennials’ 
(Connery, 2008; Dalton, 2009). Referring to this generation, a shift has been 
observed in terms of, ‘an unmistakable expansion of youth interest in politics 
and public affairs’ (Sander and Putnam, 2010: 11), in the forms of volunteering 
but also of voting. In fact, ‘2008 provides a baseline from which participation 
may expand as members of the millennial generation finish their studies, begin a 
career, purchase a home, and share the other life experiences that foster attention 
to government and politics’ (Dalton, 2009: 196). The so-called Millennials have 
been characterized as carrying specific values: pluralism and tolerance, even if 
with low trust in political institutions. Research on political socialization pointed 
at the tensions between the supply in terms of social movement organizations and 
the generational taste for horizontal organizing (Earl et al., 2017).
Today, researchers have addressed the Millennials as a generation that faces 
indeed very different life expectations and/or conditions than the previous ones, 
and it is more seriously threatened by the current economic crisis. As research in 
Europe has observed, as young people mobilized en masse in protest campaigns 
against austerity, for gender rights or territorial concerns, protest repertoires 
and frames tend to be adapted to a condition described as not only as socially 
precarious, but also as politically betrayed and civically repressed (della Porta, 
2018). This makes it particularly interesting to continue investigating how these 
citizens overcome barriers of marginalization, network and develop collective 
identities.
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Notes
 1 As some assessment process requires formal attribution, we declare that Donatella 
della Porta is responsible for sections ‘Young and anti-austerity protests in Italy: an 
introduction’ and ‘A generational comparison: some conclusions’, while Massimiliano 
Andretta for the remaining sections.
 2 The sudden and contagious mobilization by young citizens in many North Africa and 
Middle-East countries in the period between 2010 and 2011 aimed at democratizing 
their political systems (Abdih, 2011; della Porta, 2017).
 3 For detailed information on the sample methodology see van Stekelenburg et al. 
(2012) and Andretta and della Porta (2014).
 4 Professor Mario Monti was at the time prime minister of the new take-care govern-
ment formed after Silvio Berlusconi resignation in 2011.
 5 N = 548; Cr.s V: across level of education, 0.25, significant at 0.001 level.
 6 Cr.s V: only across trust in political parties and trade unions, age cohorts show statis-
tical differences (0.14 and 0.15, respectively, and both significant at 0.01 level).
 7 N: 535; CR.s V, 0.13, significant at 0.01 level.
 8 N: 431–496; Cr.s V is significant only for ‘Angry’ – 0.16 at 0.001 level.
 9 The indicator is built by dichotomizing each type of motivation getting value ‘1’ if 
the participant strongly agrees with the relative item, then normalizing the sum of all 
motivations dummies. The data in Figure 2.2 concerning this indicator are shown by 
multiplying it by 100.
 10 The scale ranges from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Thus, the closer to 0 participants place 
themselves, the more leftist they are. N = 529; ETA: 0.18, significant at 0.001 level. 
It is worth noticing that young Italian protestors appear to be much less radical than 
other young protestors from Southern Europe (Andretta and della Porta, 2015; see 
also della Porta et al., 2017).
 11 N = 515; Cr.s V: 0.28, significant at 0.001 level.
 12 N = 519; Cr.s V is not significant.
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